Turkey's Presidential Debate

In the weeks following the Turkish election there has been extensive coverage of the simmering tension between the defenders of Ataturk’s Kamalist republic and the newly re-elected populist AK Party. Most of these debates have centered around the renewal of Abdullah Gül’s candidacy for president. Opponents have claimed that the former Welfare Party (RP) member is a threat to the secular nature of the Turkish state. Amongst a host of issues, defenders of strict secularism have taken up the fact that Gül wife wears a headscarf as proof that he is unfit for the presidency. In the unitary Turkish state, as in France, the headscarf issue is more than symbolic: it strikes at the heart of republican rule. However, unlike in France which has promoted knee-jerk reactionary politics to perceived threats to national identity, the past Turkish election is hints at how a politics of recognition can open rather than close the republican realm.

In a recent interview with Zaman, Pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) parliamentary group leader Ahmet Türk - itself a party established to gain rights for the long-persecuted Kurdish minority - stated plainly the problematic aspects of an over-determination the headscarf as an issue of survival of the secular state:

“We don’t have anything to do with anybody’s headscarf. We are not dealing with that. Furthermore, we think this kind of discussion is simply wrong,”

By dismissing concerns over Gül’s presidential candidate, Türk disarms a debate that is often uses someone else’s identity as the battleground for power politics: often with disastrous consequences. Past interventions by the military and other state institutions to “defend” the secular state often undermined human rights and the process of democratic rule, with harsh consequences for minority rights. In this moment of clarity in the battle over the meaning of republicanism, Türk also defended the need to defend democratic rule and cultural rights. As he noted:

“We and our people have expectations. We have problems with democracy and human rights that need to be resolved and one of these issues is the Kurdish question. We discussed our opinions about a possible solution to this issue with Mr. Gül. The problems should be solved within the norms of a civilian democracy. We are against resolving problems by means outside democracy.”

This debate cannot be simple seen as a question of the defense of the republic but also a question of how to proceed towards further empowerment of groups historically excluded from participation in Turkish society (especially woman and Kurds); including the political and economic realm. An approach which recognizes difference is far more democratic than the use of force and the violent rule of law to strip people of their chosen identities.

Despite representation by western media* of the new government as an “Islamic” government (in the process stirring up all too common Islamaphobic sentiments), the Justice and Development Party (AKP) represents a much more complex constituency and practices a varigated politics. The AKP plays its multiple identities well, and has, at times, acted more “social democratic” than the old ruling republican CHP. The AKP has show itself willing to usurp and disrupt oppressive traditional power hierarchies. For example, in rencent elections the AKP bypassed traditional clan structures in the selection of candidates and implemented aggressive woman’s literacy programs.

On the non-state front, many political and civil society groups have supported Gül’s candidacy including the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), the Turkish Public Workers' Labor Union (Kamu-Sen) and the Turkish Union of Agricultural Chambers (TZOB) the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodities Exchanges (TOBB) and the Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions (Türk-İş). Remember, also, that it was the republican boycott of the parliament’s presidential election that forced this summer’s election. The result has been seen as a rejection of the old guard’s claim over the sanctity of the secular state. Still, the pro-republican military continues to issue vague threats. In a recent intervention the head of the Turkish army warned the government to "adhere in earnest and not just in words to the ideal of a secular, democratic state." It is an indication of the army’s long-shadow over Turkish politics, and its self-perceived role as defender of the republic. This veiled threat is also the root of the debate over who will control the state: the parliament, or the state’s powerful republican establishment. Given the checkered history of strong-willed military institutions in the defense of secularism in Turkey, and in other countries, the willingness of the powerful army to continue to interfere should be taken very seriously.

In light if these threats, however, the political mobilization should be seen as a potential opening for an extension of a Turkish-style politics of recognition. The broad based support from non-state actors and from the DTP for Gül’s candidacy should not be taken simply as support for his candidacy but rather as an emerging consensus that military-led manipulation of power will no longer be tolerated. There is within this new political alignment a preference for a non-reactionary politics of recognition over the old school tactics of de-legimitisation of identities. The days of military-led threats to the reigns of the state should slowly fade into the horizon.

(*For example, Canada’s Globe and Mail defined Gül as a “religious candidate.” I wonder if George Bush would have got the same moniker.)